Where is an Author?

Abstract: The convergence of once-separate paths of innovation in information and communications technologies and everyday social practice has precipitated a ‘Gutenberg moment’ in education at a pivotal moment in trajectories of global financialization. While there is now a significant literature devoted to the institutional and technocratic evaluation of the processes and outcomes of technologies deployed in education, the geographical implications of new cultures of teaching and learning remain dangerously under-theorized. Reading and writing, in particular, are being reconstituted through partially automated constellations of socio-technical practices of authorship. In this article, an intertextual synthesis of key works of Comte, Marx, and Foucault is deployed to reconstitute a theory of authorship for the digital age.
It’s early in the twenty-first century of the Western calendar. If you’re reading these words, there is a very high probability that the characters, words, and sentences are delivered to you on a screen, on a digital device connected by wire or wavelength to a vast, evolving ecosystem of information and algorithms. This empowers you as a reader, like no generation of readers who has ever lived before. With a few slight physical gestures, you can ask your device to search for information about the author of the words you’re reading. You can easily obtain a variety of statistics and rankings that (presumably) measure the popularity or ‘impact’ of the author’s words, or the publication where the words appear. You can find other collections of words written by other authors that manifest some kind of correlation with the authors’ words. If the author smuggles a strange word like “transdiscursive” into the text without providing a clear explanation, you can search for a definition across a wide array of blogs, wikis, Twitter feeds, and other phenomena yet to be named. Yet at this point the empowerment of search collides with the radical democracy of meanings. Among all the different ways that “transdiscursive” has been or will be used in digitally available written works, which one best captures the author’s intended meaning? At this point you may well feel offended and violated by the author’s refusal to honor the implicit social contract of authorship as it has been negotiated across the centuries of modernity. Every author has an obligation to try to make meanings clear, and, where appropriate, to explain where other authors’ words or ideas have been borrowed. Thou shalt not steal.

Some of the words you’ve read thus far were inspired by the preface to Jaron Lanier’s (2010) cyber-manifesto, *You Are Not a Gadget*; other words were shaped by Nadine Schuurman’s (2013) analysis of the Gutenberg effects of neuroplasticity in creating a new era of “Geographical Knowledge Production 2.0;” and “transdiscursive” is the English translation of
Michel Foucault’s (1969, p. 386) meaning for the position of an “author of a theory, tradition, or discipline in which other books and authors will in turn find a place.” It is the burden of my argument in this essay to demonstrate that Foucault’s conceptualization, first introduced in a lecture in Paris in February, 1969, exposes a fundamental re-scaling of the relations between authors and readers -- and especially between students and educators -- in a world of nearly-ubiquitous circuits of Internet communication, production, and surveillance. Adapted and updated through a genealogical technique that Foucault called “discursive instaurations,” and put into a dialogue with some of the more obscure, neglected parts of the works of Karl Marx and Auguste Comte, Foucault’s perspective on individual authorship provides crucial insights into the new spatialities of contemporary reading, writing, and education.

**Plagiarism Frontiers**

We need a new theory of authorship. To appreciate why, it is worth considering the frustration voiced by Mark Bauerline, a Professor of English at Emory University. “When students take on research tasks,” Bauerline writes in a commentary on college-level term papers, “here is what they don’t do:

- Visit the library and browse the stacks.
- Find an archive and examine primary documents.
- Read widely in the subject before identifying a topic.

Instead, they

- Type a term into Google.
- Consult Wikipedia’s entry on the subject.
• Download six web pages, and cut and paste passages.
• Summarize the citations and sprinkle in commentary of their own.
• Print it up and hand it in.” (Bauerline, 2011).

For Bauerline, the disciplined crafts of authorship traditionally associated with the student research paper -- sustained curiosity, deep reflection, and critical judgment -- are being destroyed by the false promises of a universe of informational tools that “offer too many shortcuts, conveniences, and well-digested materials.” “Teachers demand better usages (‘Don’t just rely on Wikipedia!'”),” Bauerline laments, “but they’re up against 19-year olds who love speed and effortlessness. Good luck.” Yet if the “free-ranging intimacy” (Walker, 2010) of the net enables more widespread plagiarism among students, educational institutions are now able to respond with an unprecedented arsenal of powerful surveillance technologies. In the emergent field of “plagiarism detection,” the Turnitin.com service has quickly become the industry leader; the cloud-based service creates a “digital fingerprint” for each student paper submitted to the system, and compares the results to an evolving database of more than 110 thousand publications, 300 million archived student papers, and more than 40 billion web pages -- all across 18 languages in more than one hundred countries (iParadigms, 2012a, 2012b, 2013; Barrie, 2008).

Turnitin.com was developed by John Barrie, who watched rhetoric and neurobiology in what he describes as “a less than ideal undergraduate experience” at Berkeley. Continuing at Berkeley for doctoral work in biophysics and neurobiology, Barrie specialized in research on
“how spatiotemporal patterns of the EEG (electroencephalogram) over the primary sensory neocortices could help one understand how the brain encoded the sensory world into the neuro-world, how those patterns changed with time and ultimately how those patterns came together to form our conscious representation of the world.” (Barrie, 2008, p. 16).

At the same time he was refining observational experiments and analytical algorithms for his doctoral research, Barrie served as a Teaching Assistant for several large undergraduate courses, where he saw his own undergraduate experience from a new vantage point: “class sizes approaching the ridiculous” made it impossible for students to get any detailed feedback on their work, creating “a cold and impersonal environment that was exacerbated by a brutal grading curve” (Barrie, 2008, p. 16). In 1994, Barrie (2008, p. 16) realized he could “use these new things called the ‘web’ and the ‘browser’ to facilitate a completely digital version of class manuscript peer review” to provide rich, thorough feedback for enhanced student engagement.

Unfortunately, Barrie soon discovered that many students were taking papers from his new peer review system and submitting them for other classes. “I had inadvertently created a mini-cheat site,” Barrie (2008, p. 17) realized. Barrie came to a decisive turning point: “Now things began to change. I was more than a little irritated that a significant minority of students were cheating their way to an unfair competitive advantage over their peers. And I was aiding and abetting by providing hundreds of students with their peers’ manuscripts via the class website. I felt a need to put a stop to that problem....
...a real deterrent would require the real threat of getting caught doing the wrong thing. In my analysis, the only real threat would involve creating a database so massive that, when a student is told that their paper will be compared with documents in that database, a student is deterred from cheating. That database would have to include all of the sources a student might use to cheat: the Internet, things in the library and millions of student papers ... The only problem was: how does one search those billions of documents in real time?

The solution was to use algorithms designed to detect regularities in large databases of brain waves and apply the same strategy to detect regularities (i.e., unoriginal work) in large databases of text.” (Barrie, 2008, pp. 17-18).

Barrie’s vision required a decade of refinement, as well as backing by a $40-billion private equity firm (Warburg Pincus), but the service eventually grew to become one of the most widely used educational applications in the world. Turnitin.com processed more than 80 million student papers in 2012, and maintains contracts with more than ten thousand educational institutions -- including 130 of the top 200 universities ranked by the Times Higher Education World Rankings (iParadigms, 2013). The service has withstood several legal challenges by students forced to submit their work to (and thus enhance the proprietary data assets of) a private company (Brinkman, 2012). Initially, Turnitin’s parent company (Paradigm, LLC) has redirected

iThenticate® is promoted to
publishers and editors of books and scholarly journals. Turnitin.com’s plagiarism detection functions, moreover, are seamlessly integrated into the comprehensive “SmarterGrading™ with GradeMark” interface, allowing educators to provide a wide range of different kinds of feedback on students’ writing. QuickMark® Sets allow teachers to “save time and provide better feedback by quickly dragging standard or custom marks and comments directly on the paper”; the Voice Comments function allows teachers to “guide students with personalized audio feedback that conveys your ‘tone’ and clarifies QuickMark® comments”; and with Grade AnywhereSM on Turnitin for iPad®, teachers can provide all of this rich feedback from anywhere, anytime (iParadigms, 2013). In October, 2013, Turnitin.com launched “Cloud Submit,” an interface allowing direct submission of papers from Google Drive and DropBox.

iParadigms’ innovations are only one small part of a fast-expanding universe of educational technologies premised on the synthesis of support and surveillance. These technological developments have been driven by anticipations of the infinite “scalability” of massive open online courses (MOOCs) (Heller, 2013). The array of innovations includes authentication software for MOOC remote-testing facilities that analyze the keystroke typing rhythms of students taking examinations (Eisenberg, 2013), “machine learning” algorithms for automated grading of student essays (Markoff, 2013), and tracking systems designed to monitor online reading activities by counting page views and click-throughs to calculate an “engagement index” for each student (Streitfeld, 2013). There is now a significant scholarly literature analyzing how these transformations are enmeshed in the neoliberalization of education, and how individual students and educators are being enrolled into accelerated -- and partially automated -- circuits of digital governmentality (e.g., Castells et al., 1999; Noble, 2001; Brinkman, 2012; Boler, 2007; Smith and Jeffery, 2013). Nevertheless, despite the valuable
critical insights in this literature -- from David Noble’s (2001) early diagnosis of “digital diploma mills” to Megan Boler’s (2007) feminist theorization of the false promises of “digital Cartesianism” -- a case can be made that research in this area has remained too modest, and too deferential. Most of the literature remains focused on the effects of technological change on familiar, discrete social roles -- (students, teachers, administrators) or social practices (reading, writing, teaching) -- as if these words carry the same meanings we’ve all been taught to recognize. They do not. Each of these social positions has been redefined through radical technological contingency, etching fine-grained divisions of working conditions, learning experiences, audit and surveillance capabilities, and implications for knowledge production.

“We are in a Gutenberg moment in which we are migrating from book reading to Internet browsing,” Nadine Schuurman (2013, p. 396) reminds us, and it is worth considering the stunning acceleration of changes that have diffused widely in just the past few years. If the latter half of the twentieth century came to be defined by the gathering momentum of computerization and automation in a mechanical, wholesale sense, the twenty-first century brought a sudden phase shift in the role of digitized information in the cognitive, retail experience of capitalist culture. We suddenly find ourselves in a world of information that is fast evolving into a proliferation of informational worlds. By the most authoritative estimates available, the share of all of humanity’s recorded information stored in digital form increased from 25 percent in 2000 to 98 percent in 2013; there is now about 1,200 exabytes worth of information in the world (Hilbert and Lopez, 2011, updated in Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013, p. 9).

This flood of information is rapidly redefining the meanings and functions of communication in contemporary human culture -- in the dynamic, shifting, and blurred boundaries among news, politics, entertainment, and education. Precisely the same sudden ease
of access to a world of information that encourages the student’s quick search and cut-and-paste now enables the real-time deployment of corporate neurological software to compare an individual’s writing to an expanding database of human communication that is rapidly becoming planetary. A growing share of today’s new human expression is taking place in digital form, while initiatives like Project Gutenberg, the Wayback Machine and Internet Archive, and Google’s monumental book-scanning project are quickly digitizing all possible traces of the cultural past. Not long ago, Trevor Barnes (2013, p. 297) 

“heard the all-around American philosopher scientist, James Owen Weatherall, say on a podcast that for every individual in America there are 200 Ancient Alexandria Libraries worth of information that have been collected and stored about them. The Library at Alexandria contained everything worth knowing in the ancient world. So, we now have 200 times what was worth knowing about the ancient world for every living American, and likely a few dead ones too.”

No generation in human history has ever lived in such an environment of planetary digital information. Teachers and students are thrown into new digital worlds. The meanings -- and the spaces and times -- of reading, learning, and teaching are in flux. So are the meanings of the Latin word for a writer, a maker, an originator -- the term that eventually became the Anglo-French autour.

Comte, Marx, and Foucault

In an age when an author’s words can instantly be combined or compared with a global corpus of the words of all authors, what does “authorship” mean? The enigmatic position of the author is certainly nothing new: the conditions of possibility of collective human knowledge
advanced and transmitted through individual action have always been a central concern of
philosophy. We can gain a fresh perspective on the matter, however, if we consider key
moments of revolutionary instability in the philosophy of human knowledge at the juncture of
science, politics, and theology. This requires consideration of an odd combination: Auguste
Comte, Karl Marx, and Michel Foucault.

No other trio makes for a greater sense of theoretical cognitive dissonance: at first glance
it might seem a fool’s errand to search for common ground between the austere father of
positivism who later became the “High Priest of the Religion of Humanity,” (Mill, 1891, p. 125)
the historical materialist analyst of capitalism, and the archaeologist of knowledge whose
inquiries into the ‘limit experience’ of human philosophy involved intense readings of
and Heidegger as well as LSD trips in Death Valley and the “entirely different truth”
of gay liberation in San Francisco in the 1970s (quoted in Miller, 1993, p. 28, p. 245). Comte,
Marx, and Foucault were each discursively enigmatic and politically radical -- but in starkly
different historical and geographical circumstances of what radicalism meant. Most of the few
fragments of their direct engagements with one another are reflexively negative. “I am studying
Comte on the side just now,” Marx wrote in a letter to Engels in the summer of 1866,

“as the English and French are making such a fuss of the fellow. What seduces
them about him is is encyclopaedic quality, *la synthèse*. But that is pitiful when
compared with Hegel (although Comte is superior to him as a mathematician and
physicist by profession, i.e. superior in the detail, though even here Hegel is
infinitely greater as a whole). And this shitty positivism came out in 1832!”
(Marx, 1866, p. 289).
But Marx was late; the shitty positivist himself, “the thinker of Humanity in place of God.” (Wernick, 2001, p. 220) had been dead for almost a decade. Foucault, working to think outside and beyond the lineage of Marx, Husserl, Hegel, and Sartre in what Gilles Deleuze called the “malicious gift” of The Order of Things, refused to exempt Marxism from the “archaeology that smashes its idols” (quoted in Miller, 1993, p. 152). Marxism “introduced no real discontinuity” in human understanding “at the deepest level of Western knowledge,” Foucault (1966, p. 285) declared, because European modernity’s conceptualization of History established its conditions of possibility. “Marxism exists in nineteenth century thought like a fish in water: that is, it is unable to breathe anywhere else.” Foucault certainly admired the oppositional aspirations of Marx’s “nineteenth century revolutionary economics” against “nineteenth century bourgeois economics,” but Foucault’s archaeology was unforgiving: “Their controversies may have stirred up a few waves and caused a few surface ripples: but they are no more than storms in a children’s paddling pool.” (Foucault, 1966, p. 285).

Yet such quotes are deceptive. Comte, Marx, and Foucault shared a panoramic, critical view of the development of human scientific thought in and through the constitution of modernity. All three were deeply concerned with the relationship between individual and collective knowledge, and with the implications of changes in knowledge in the physical sciences for the domain of social relations and politics. Marx admired la synthèse of Comte’s attempt to apply the advances of the physical sciences to the problems of politics and society precisely because they shared a revulsion to the stubborn, atomistic individualism of economic liberalism backed by military force and theological politics; both were obsessed with the “species-specific capabilities of man” (Lenzer, 1972/1973, p. lv) through collective work and knowledge. And Foucault (1966, p. 346) saw the connection too, even as he mercilessly dismantled the
materialism of Marx’s “species being” and the secular scientism of Comte in favor of an
ontology of discourse. Foucault (1966, p. 347) begins his inquiry into the “strange empirico-
transcendental doublet” of man at the Cartesian, individual scale: “he is a being such that
knowlege will be attained in him of what renders all knowledge possible.” But then Foucault
takes an unusual approach to get to the scale of societal knowledge, arguing that Comte and
Marx established (albeit in contradictory ways) the fundamental importance of theory and
discourse as constitutive of, and not only reflective of, the “real”:

“Comte and Marx both bear out the fact that eschatology (as the objective truth
proceeding from man’s discourse) and positivism (as the truth of discourse
defined on the basis of the truth of the object) are archaeologically indissociable:
a discourse attempting to be both empirical and critical cannot but be both
positivist and eschatological; man appears within it as a truth both reduced and
promised. Pre-critical naïveté holds undivided rule.” (Foucault, 1966, p. 349).

The very conditions of possibility of human knowledge, in other words, rest on “a truth
that is of the order of discourse -- a truth that makes it possible to employ, when dealing with the
nature or history of knowledge, a language that will be true.” (Foucault, 1966, p. 348). But the
“status of this discourse,” despite all the advances of science in the nineteenth century, “remains
ambiguous” (Foucault, 1966, p. 348).
the generations at a time in human history when science is suppressed by religious authoritarianism; for Marx, the decisive issue is the question of class consciousness as human consciousness itself becomes interwoven into capitalist relations of production; and for Foucault, the dilemma involves the “empirico-transcendental” tensions of human knowledge constituted within individual consciousness and among humans.

Consider Comte’s view first. Today, Comte is mostly remembered for the six-volume *Course in Positive Philosophy*, published between 1830 and 1842. Yet the *Course* was only the first half of a grand vision Comte had outlined in an essay written in 1822. The second half of Comte’s project resulted in the four-volume *System of Positive Polity*, published between 1851 and 1854. The *Course* formalized and consolidated the methods of empirical science against the medieval repressions of Catholic theocracy -- and, through the influences and transformations of John Stuart Mill and then the Vienna Circle, established the foundations of the twentieth century’s various strains of logical empiricism, logical positivism, and methodological positivism (Scharff, 1995; Steinmetz, 2005). The *System* was very different, and in fact was widely dismissed as the product of a nervous breakdown and heartbreak after “the extraordinary episode” of Comte’s “brief, passionate, but ‘morally pure’ affair with the ineligible Clotilde de Vaux” (Wernick, 2001, p. 24). Clotilde died in 1846.

The *System* was an outline for a comprehensive, secular “Plan of the Scientific Operations Necessary for Reorganizing Society.” This was the title of the essay Comte wrote in his early twenties and spent the rest of his life elaborating. The *Course* was intended to end, once and for all, the reign of religious and metaphysical dogmas that were suppressing the advance of human scientific knowledge. The *System* was the next, positive, step. As the illusions of theological knowledge and metaphysical philosophy succumbed to the achievements
of positive science, Comte redirected scientific inquiry to the most complex phenomena of all: human politics and human subjectivity. “Social physics” served as the unifying framework for Comte’s brilliant yet monomanically authoritarian attempt to master-plan a new political order for post-Revolutionary France (and then the entire world). The System also outlined a detailed science of ethics. The entire scientific manifesto came with a corresponding political program to spread positivist scientific knowledge through “revolutionary schools” and a full-fledged “Religion of Humanity” to replace Christian dogma with a catechism honoring successive generations of scientists who had led the advance of human progress and development. The clearest summary of Comte’s motivation comes from Robert Park, who sought old-world philosophical legitimacy when building the young field of sociology at the University of Chicago in the 1920s. In “The Social Organism and the Collective Mind,” Park defined ‘society’ with Comte’s conceptualization of a “collective organism” sustained by consensus:

“The individual, as Comte expressed it, is an abstraction. Man exists as man only by participation in the life of humanity. ... the individual man was, in spite of his freedom and independence, in a very real sense ‘an organ of the Great Being’ and the great being was humanity. Under the title of humanity Comte included not merely all living human beings ... but he included all that body of tradition, knowledge, custom, cultural ideas and ideals, which make up the social inheritance ... an inheritance into which each of us is born, to which we contribute, and which we inevitably hand on through the processes of education and tradition to succeeding generations. This is what Comte meant by the social organism.” (Park, 1921, p. 2).
Now consider Marx. In a brief passage in the *Grundrisse*, Marx foresaw human knowledge and experience materialized into the infrastructure of capitalist production:

“Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs, self-acting mules, etc. These are products of human industry, natural material transformed into organs of the human will over nature, or of human participation in nature. They are *organs of the human brain, created by the human hand*; the power of knowledge, objectified. The development of fixed capital indicates to what degree general social knowledge has become a *direct force* of production, and to what degree, hence, the conditions of the process of social life itself have come under the control of the general intellect and been transformed in accordance with it. To what degree the powers of social production have been produced, not only in the form of knowledge, but as immediate organs of social practice, of the real life process.” (Marx, 1857/1858, p. 706, emphasis in original).

The “organs of the human brain” and the “general intellect” were portrayed in Volume III of *Capital* in terms of those processes that could achieve economies of scale in the use of fixed capital:

“These savings in the use of fixed capital ... are the result of the way the conditions of labour have been applied on a large scale. In short, the way in which they serve as conditions of directly social, socialized labour, of direct cooperation within the production process. ...” (Marx, 1894, p. 198).
Marx highlighted three key features of “directly social” labor -- the capacity for mechanical and chemical inventions to unfold “without increasing the price of commodities,” the economies of scale attained through “productive consumption in common,” and then a crucial third dimension:

“Finally, however, it is only the experience of the combined worker that discovers and demonstrates how inventions already made can most simply be developed, how to overcome the practical frictions that arise in putting the theory into practice -- its application to the production process, and so on.” (Marx, 1894, pp. 198-199).

“We must distinguish here, incidentally,” Marx adds, “between universal labour and communal labour. They both play their part in the production process, and merge into one another, but they are each different as well. Universal labour is all scientific work, all discovery and invention. It is brought about partly by the cooperation of men now living, but partly also by building on earlier work. Communal labour, however, simply involves the direct cooperation of individuals.” (Marx, 1894, p. 199).

Within the vast contemporary Marxist literature, we can find work that directly extends and refines some of Marx’s original ideas on the “general intellect.” Harvey (2012, p. 4), for example, puts Henri Levebvre’s “right to the city” theorization into a dialogue not only with Marx, but also with Robert Park’s memorable quip that “in making the city man has remade
himself,” while Allen Scott (2011, p. 846; also Scott, 2013) diagnoses a new frontier of globalized “cognitive-cultural capitalism” defined by

“(1) the new forces of production that reside in digital technologies of computing and communication; (2) the new divisions of labor that are appearing in the detailed organization of production and in related processes of social re-stratification, and (3) the intensifying role of mental and affective human assets (alternatively, cognition and culture) in the commodity production system at large.”

Comte’s Great Being of humanity is not theoretically incompatible with Marx’s conceptualization of the general intellect. The heritage of social knowledge in the “social organism” in industrial modernity is manifest as the immediate organs of social practice on the shop floor: the power of knowledge, objectified in the increasingly complex rhythms of human divisions of labor of expanding capitalist enterprise. This brings us to Foucault’s “most fiendishly intricate text,” (Miller, 1993, p. 18), The Order of Things. Foucault (1966, p. xxiii) sought to analyze the collective human experience through the evolution of “ordering codes” and “reflections upon order itself” in the development of scientific knowledge since the sixteenth century; he investigated “in what way … our culture has made manifest the existence of order” and how “modalities of order have been recognized, posited, linked with space and time, in order to create the positive basis of knowledge” as we find it in the emergence of contemporary scientific modernity (Foucault, 1966, p. xxiii). The endeavor is “an enquiry whose aim is to rediscover on what basis knowledge and theory become possible” and how sciences and philosophies could be established, “only, perhaps, to dissolve and vanish soon afterwards.”
Foucault had no desire to “describe the progress of knowledge towards an objectivity in which today’s science can finally be recognized,” but instead focused on the *epistemic field* in which human knowledge grounds its “positivity” not only in rationality and objectivity, but its “conditions of possibility” within the “space of knowledge” as it is created and negotiated across the generations of human inquiry. “Such an enterprise is not so much a history in the traditional meaning of that word,” Foucault (1966, p. xxiv) emphasizes, as an “archaeology.”

The “space of knowledge,” and any corresponding archaeology, is defined through generations of human inquiry, communication, and indeed the conceptualization of humanity itself. This is where the ambiguity of a truth discourse matters, because “the threshold of our modernity is situated not by the attempt to apply objective methods to the study of men” -- this is where Foucault rejects the very extreme applications of Comte’s (1832) social physics -- “but rather by the constitution of an empirico-transcendental doublet which was called *man*” (Foucault, 1966, p. 347). This is the nineteenth century’s sudden flashpoint that separates *individual* Cartesian empirical observation from the philosophical, cumulative scientism of *collective* knowledge:

“Two kinds of analysis then come into being. There are those that operate within the space of the body, and -- by studying perception, sensorial mechanisms, neuro-motor diagrams, and the articulation common to things and to the organism -- function as a sort of transcendental aesthetic; these led to the discovery that knowledge has anatomo-physiological conditions, that it is formed gradually within the structures of the body, that it may have a privileged place within it, but that its forms cannot be dissociated from its peculiar functioning; in short, that there is a *nature* of human knowledge that determines its forms and that can at the
same time be made manifest to it in its own empirical contents. There were also analyses that -- by studying humanity’s more or less ancient, more or less easily vanquished illusions -- functioned as a sort of transcendental dialectic; by this means it was shown that knowledge had historical, social, or economic conditions, that it was formed within the relations that are woven between men, and that it was not independent of the particular form they might take here or there; in short, that there was a *history* of human knowledge that could both be given to empirical knowledge and prescribe its form.” (Foucault, 1966, p. 348).

But it was Comte “who had first thought through the implications of bringing Man collectively into the episteme of modern science.” (Wernick, 2001, pp. 50-51).

Vico’s “cultural” capitalism under conditions of integration and networking, and increasingly automated infrastructures of digital superstructures. A particularly potent critical sensibility emerges if we engage Comte and Marx with Foucault’s 1969 lecture, “What is an Author?”
What is an Author?

“The coming into being of the notion of ‘author,’” Foucault (1969, p. 377) begins in a lecture presented to the Société Française de Philosophie in early 1969, “constitutes the privileged moment of individualization in the history of ideas, knowledge, literature, philosophy, and the sciences.” This privileged moment has been misunderstood, Foucault avers, and we can learn much by reconsidering “the relationship between text and author” and the ways a written text “points to this figure that, at least in appearance, is outside and antecedes it.” (Foucault, 1969, p. 377). Foucault’s lecture is a compelling blend of demanding antifoundationalist theoretical challenges punctuated by clear, concise attacks on the simplistic conventions of “the man-and-his-work criticism” of literary modernism. The classical traditions of Greek epic and Arabian narratives, for example, achieved immortality for writers as well as heroes, yet now “our culture has metamorphosed this idea of narrative, or writing,” in newly threatening ways. “The work, which once had the duty of providing immortality, now possesses the right to kill, to be its author’s murderer, as in the cases of Flaubert, Proust, and Kafka.” (Foucault, 1969, p. 378).

Here Foucault (1969, p. 378) offers a generous modesty -- “None of this is recent criticism and philosophy took note of the disappearance -- or death -- of the author some time ago” -- as a prelude to a more devastating critique: “A certain number of notions that are intended to replace the privileged position of the author actually seem to preserve that privilege and suppress the real meaning of his disappearance.” Preliminaries complete, Foucault has prepared his audience for his broader purpose: a wide-ranging project of destabilization that induces theoretical and literary vertigo. Foucault’s conceptually rich analysis defies casual, linear summary: here we cannot avoid reading a transdiscursive continuity through Foucault into the more impenetrable
thickets of Marx and Comte. For my purposes, however, it is necessary to tease out three distinct elements of Foucault’s analysis of authorial modernity in order to illuminate today’s technological metamorphosis of writing, teaching, and learning.

The first matter is best described as a theory of the *unbounded author* -- an ambiguous, contingent extension of the work (œuvre) that simultaneously erodes the self of authorship. If an individual is not yet recognized nor respected as an authority, “could we say that what he wrote, said, or left behind in his papers, or what has been collected of his remarks, could be called a ‘work’”? (Foucault, 1969, p. 379). Once the question is posed, other complications are apparent:

> “Even when an individual has been accepted as an author, we must still ask whether everything that he wrote, said, or left behind is part of his work. The problem is both theoretical and technical. When undertaking the publication of Nietzsche’s works, for example, where should one stop? Surely everything must be published, but what is ‘everything’? Everything that Nietzsche himself published, certainly. And what about the rough drafts for his works? Obviously. The plans for his aphorisms? Yes. The deleted passages and the notes at the bottom of the page? Yes. What if, within a workbook filled with aphorisms, one finds a reference, the notation of a meeting or of an address, or a laundry list: is it a work, or not? Why not? And so on, ad infinitum. How can one define a work amid the millions of traces left by someone after his death? A theory of the work does not exist, and the empirical task of those who naively undertake the editing of works often suffers in the absence of such a theory.” (Foucault, 1969, p. 379).
As you read these words in the retinal-resolution pixellated aura of the latest wireless device _du jour_, such expressions from February of 1969 may arrive with a resonance of quaint nostalgia tinged with eerie prescience. You may share my desperate desire to read the emails of Proust and Kafka. And their text messages. All their tweets. Facebook status updates and wall posts. Instagram selfies and foursquare check-ins. Is it possible? Or is it? Anyone in the world today who tweets a line of Nietzsche or Foucault while cramming for a test has authored some kind of contribution to the expanding planetary digitization of Marx’s “general intellect,” enhancing the direct force of informational production for Google’s leveraged capitalization of humanity’s inherited legacy of knowledge in Comte’s “Great Being” of an evolutionary Internet.

Can today’s global social mediascape really be connected to authors of the past? A second dimension of Foucault’s analysis demands that we give serious consideration to such questions. There is “a paradoxical singularity of the author’s name,” Foucault (1969, p. 381) emphasizes, quite. This is because an author’s name “performs a certain role with regard to narrative discourse, assuring a classificatory function” (Foucault, 1969, p. 381) that is separate from the matter of one-to-one personal, authentic identity. The author’s name, as a representation of an individual embedded in society and human communication, through the ways readers engage with a written text, permits one to group together a certain number of texts, define them, differentiate them from and contrast them to others. In addition, it establishes...
a relationship among the texts. (Flaubert 1969, p. 281). The author is an intellectual property, a brand, and a socially-created identity. The identity lives within the communicating minds of readers as much as, and often more than, the mind of the individual author. The "author function" is invested with collective social meanings on who is speaking, and who should pay attention.
References


iParadigms, LLC (2012b). *WriteCheck™ by Turnitin & ETS® e-rater®*. Oakland, CA: iParadigms, LLC.


The author's name is not an individual identity, but rather a representation of an individual embedded in society and human communication through the ways readers engage with the author's works. The author's name thus "group together a certain number of texts, define them, differentiate them and contrast them to others," while establishing "a relationship among the texts." In a contemporary, cynical interpretation of Foucault's reasoning, the author is a brand, an intellectual property with a market value negotiated through the infrastructures of cultural-product industries and copyright law. Such valorization, however, is only possible because the "author function" is a collective, socially-created identity. This identity transcends any creativity in the mind of the
individual author. The identity is constituted within and between the communicable minds of readers; the author function is an investment of collective social meanings regarding words whose words and ideas are worth paying attention to.
rejects what he perceives as the raw, mechanistic implications of Cantor’s (1842) social physics —
The "author function" makes the name of an individual require more serious work than an ordinary proper name.
Such collective social investments have varied historically, with corresponding contingency in the author function. Foucault remarks that earlier narratives, epics, and other works we would today understand as literature were widely accepted without concern for the identity of the author; conversely, texts that we would today classify as scientific (medicine, natural sciences, geography) were acknowledged as true only when marked with the author's name. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, however, the author function is transformed by discoveries of science, coming to be vitalized through a new 

bring a reversal in the author function.
Anonymity becomes acceptable in science, where discourse is increasingly validated through their "membership in a systematic ensemble" rather than by reference to the individual who produced them: the author function becomes a matter of classification (with inventors' names used to label theories, effects, or pathologies) instead of validation. At the same time, literary culture develops a much more strict adherence to the author function:

"we now ask of each poetic or fictional text: from where does it come, who wrote it, under what circumstances, or beginning with what design?" (Foucault, 1969, p. 383).

When a text is presented left anonymous (by accident or intent) the game becomes one of rediscovery of the author. Since literary anonymity is intolerable, not tolerable, we can accept it only in the guise of an enigma." (Foucault, 1969, p. 383).

Today the author function is once again in transition. The positivist presumption of a "systematic ensemble" of scientific truth-claims validated through experimentation is now perpetually in conflict with the financial rewards to those authors recognized as the source of innovation.
At the same time, "digital networks" are being described as "networks of networks," connected through "networks of networks" and "networks of networks." This describes a "meta-network" as a "met-network" of "meta-networks" that is "meta-networked." This is a "meta-network" of "meta-networks" of "meta-networks." This is a "meta-network" of "meta-networks" of "meta-networks." This is a "meta-network" of "meta-networks" of "meta-networks." This is a "meta-network" of "meta-networks" of "meta-networks."
and indeed all discourses are now validated and constructed through real-time streams of data on purchases, downloads, citations and other digital representations of audience engagement.

As the author function is digitized on a planetary Internet, more of the discourses around author function are being "constituted through online practices. This brings us to the third key dimension of Foucault's "archaeology of authorship: the societal transformation of collective thought initiated by individual authors."

...
Foucault coins the term transdiscursive to denote authors who create disciplines, traditions, or theories in which other authors "will in turn find a place." Nineteenth-century European modernity, moreover, brings even more remarkable kind of authors that Foucault calls the "founders of discursive." These authors create works that establish "the possibilities as the rules for the formation of other texts," enabling the conditions of possibility not just for analogies and similarities, and imitations (as in the case novels and playwrights) but also for transformative differences, in the sense of the Text.

Foucault's "founders of discursive" create texts that set the parameters for interpretation, adaptation, and challenge -- enabling "an endless possibility of discourse." These founders are not automatically the authors of theories and methods. Their role is to establish...
ironically

Here, Foucault slips into an implicit positive

demarcation between founders of discursivity and founders
of science. In scientific innovation, even the most exceptional author
is positioned at a definite historical juncture of
discovery; the
discourse of

individuality and circumstances of

so that

the discourse

recedes

Galileo's

one

observations, theories, and methods can
become part of the systematic ensemble of

Collective scientific knowledge. Subsequent

scientific advances may


remove the discursive

details of a scientific text, but

may undo some

of the necessary

in the work of a founder of science

(necessitating appropriate amendments in how contemporary

science is refined or applied, but these later
developments cannot alter the founding scientist's
discourse itself. Galileo's texts are what they are.
By contrast, true founders of discursivity -- Foucault singles out Freud and Marx as the first and most important -- create inherently dynamic, shifting spaces of knowledge that evolve through repeated "return to the origins." Successive generations of authors engage with the texts of their change theories of Marxism, but instead of uncovering fixed, external postulates addressed by Marx and other founders of discursivity, "have created a possibility for something other than their discourse, yet something belonging to what they founded." (Foucault, 1969, p. 388).
This ambiguity provides a valuable -- yet obscure, neglected, and forgotten -- line of continuity between the political philosophy of knowledge that concerned Comte, Marx, and Foucault. Today, there is mounting evidence that this ambiguity in the ambiguous truth status of a discourse of human knowledge has become performative in new ways, through automated integration into the algorithms of cloud-computing surveillance systems like iParadigms.
Part of Comte's struggle, moreover, was directly concerned with the transcendental dialectic between the collective of knowledge formed within relations among people versus the sate perceptions, anatomophysiological conditions of perception within individual human brains. In a deeply polarized cultural and theological context, the conservative philosopher Victor Cousin popularized a doctrine of "interior observation" as a last line of intellectual defense for the edicts of France's feudal-Catholic hegemony. Comte's revolutionary scientific challenge to Cousin is now long forgotten, in no small part because of a crucial misinterpretation by Mill (Scharff, 1995); yet the matter of "interior observation" is again all the rage in contemporary cognitive-capitalism as evidenced by the enormous investments now committed to research at the nexus of neuroscience, behavioral economics, and target marketing.

Comte's attempt to replace theological radical proposal for a science of humanity as a collective phenomenon -- the 'Great Being' -- thus merits
careful consideration alongside Marx's general intellect and Foucault's empirico-transcendental dialect of human knowledge. Comte, Marx, and Foucault needed to make sense of the networked neoliberalization of contemporary global capitalism, with ubiquitous Internet connectivity and increasingly automated infrastructures of digital production, consumption, and surveillance.
Functional MRI brain scans are now used with evolutionary psychological theories of the human mind as nothing more than “computational systems that have evolved ... in evolutionarily relevant domains such as survival, mating, kin selection, and reciprocity” (Giovinco and Sacco, 2008, p. 397).

Comte's challenge to Victor Cousin's defense of established privileges is a precursor to the bulwark of the established political-economic power in contemporary challenges to the neo-theological commitment of classical economics to the doctrine of consumer sovereignty.
Where is a Author?

We are now in position to re-examine the contemporary geography of the concept of authorship.

--

Recall the argument thus far:

1. **Re-defining the meanings of authorship**

   a) The resurgence of interest in surveillance, a vast, unprecedented infrastructure of surveillance;

   b) The days of the plagiarism test are numbered.

2. **Today's revolutionary turmoil in knowledge production can be understood from a unique perspective by engaging with Condé's post-humanist understanding of collective human knowledge as the “Great Being”**.

---

Marx's theorization of the **general intellect** as a direct force of production, and Foucault's genealogy of the “empirico-transcendental doubled subject” of knowledge.
constituted within and between human minds. 3) Foucault’s 1969 lecture, "What is an Author?" presents a particularly catalytic is an especially powerful catalyst for understanding a critical analysis of authorship in an iParadigms world if we undertake a ‘return to the origin’ of selected concepts developed by Comte, Marx, and Foucault. After considering all these seemingly contradictory prerequisites, how can we theorize contemporary authorship?

If I take it as axiomatic that authorship involves individual creativity arising from conditions of possibility that are inescapably collective, socially and spatially constitutive of language, communication, and recognition. Individual and societal knowledge are dialectically interwoven as individuals negotiate their identities through the production of cultural and scholarly research.
Sometimes these currents of learning yield cumulative advances that are understood as progress; sometimes they yield destabilization and revolutionary shifts in thought.

in currents of learning, the major (bracing and) yields cumulative developments that are understood as progress. What is decisive, however, is the nature of the capacity for individuals to gain access to, and contribute to, socially necessary parts of the effective accumulation of human knowledge produced by individuals from other times and places. I apologize for the cumbersome terminology; but "socially necessary partiality" is essential.

[highlighted text: "is absolutely essential to my argument, meaning."

The socially necessary labor power of Marx's analysis of commodity production has penetrated the internally humanized time of attention, reflection, understanding, and abstraction, when adopted for a globalized cognitive-cultural capitalism, has its corollary in the inherent human limitations of attention, reflection, understanding, and expression. The arts of creativity is impossible, through abstraction and selection. An author's creativity is impossible without selection, abstraction, focus, and concentration.

The arts of creativity is impossible, through abstraction and selection. An author's creativity is impossible without selection, abstraction, focus, and concentration.

[highlighted text: "G3"]

built on the commodification of the human attention span,
Given the limits of biological human cognition, the
creative act of authorship--
engaged in the act of knowledge
and individual engagement
with the collective accumulation of human knowledge--
is necessarily partiality. The socially
necessary aspects of this partiality are historically
defined by the cultural,
material,
and political context in which an
author makes necessary decisions that are relevant and useful for particular purposes.

If partiality is essential to what it means to be an author,
however, technological acceleration has created an
infinite possibility. From the
global village, the technologies
of
and the reduction of barriers to individuals
G5

The internet promises universal access, and thereby facilitates a more democratic and participatory society than ever before. It enables the exchange of ideas and information on a global scale, breaking down barriers that have long been in place.

Authorship under modernity had to be defined by a profession, but in the digital age, anyone can contribute to the collective knowledge and creativity. This democratization of knowledge opens up new possibilities for expression and collaboration, empowering individuals and communities to create and share their ideas and experiences.

By leveraging digital technologies and tools, the barriers to participation are lowered, allowing more people to contribute to the collective body of knowledge. This shift towards a more participatory society is transforming how we understand and interact with the world around us.
But a few things happened on the way to informational infinity. Aggregated, societal achievements in human creativity and collaboration—alongside the exacerbation of dangerous psychosocial risks—are the everyday paradox of this accelerating technology. Everyday life has become hyperindividual and hyperpluralism.

Experiences with epidemics of neurological hyperactivity have changed the landscape of educational practice.
Behavioral adaptations to cope with the constant threat of information overload have become the essence of life in many domains of cognitive-cultural capitalism. The pressures are especially significant in education, in which educational institutions, trapped in a speeding hamster-wheel of intensifying standardized competition to achieve “world-class” status in various ranking and testing regimes, now struggle to cope with multiple epidemics of individualized dangers: rising rates of…

Increases in the legitimate diagnoses of ADHD; thriving underground economies for the off-label use of Adderall, Ritalin, and other ADHD drugs as academic steroids; evolutionary plaques of cyberbullying and Internet addiction that, at the limit, are regularly implicated in cases of student suicides; and, of course, the varied forces of competition, anxiety, and expediency that lead many students to plagiarize. Here we come full circle to Paradis’s surveillance of billions of web pages in dozens of languages across the planet, implemented through infrastructural changes.
The creative adaptation of analytical protocols learned through an individual author’s interest in spatiotemporal patterns of the electroencephalogram over the primary sensory neocortices of human brains, when the Paradigmus algorithm is fused with Cloud Submit™ and billions of web pages, Foucault’s separation closes: automated cognitive pattern-recognition software integrates the neuro-motor diagrams of the transcendental aesthetic with the historiographies of the transcendental dialectic of an infinite Google.
97 Contemporary authorship is defined by three transformations of the individual creativity within the conditions of possibility of collective human knowledge. In each of these, the philosophical assumptions of nineteenth-century modernity that concerned Condorcet, Marx, and Foucault have become mundane, yet taken-for-granted capacities of the device on which you're reading these words: the order of things as an app.

98 First, Foucault's unbounded author has exploded, propelling the innumerable traces of authorial creativity inward to the scale of the 'autono-physiological' conditions of the human brain and outward to the scale of global circuits of communication and learning. Indeed, the dramatic advances of neuroscience of recent decades have been realized with the popularization of participatory science, cognitive-cultural venture capital and Silicon Valley innovation. The very popular brain is now marketed as "based on the science of neuroplasticity," as the various training celebrities are shown in unity butler with Siri.

The blast radius includes heroes and villains.
an ad campaign for a recent Android smartphone portrayed a man in a futuristic laboratory undergoing cybernetic enhancements: “brain upgrade complete... predictive intelligence with Google Now... It’s not just a upgrade for your phone... It’s an upgrade for your self.” Outward, the cumulative aggregation of billions of socially networked individuals is now described as a “new social operating system” (Ramírez, 2013) that is a global “hive mind” capable of speed, efficiency, and allocation of a global “cognitive surplus” (Shirky, 2010) unleashed by the interactive, collaborative unprecedented possibilities of real-time collaboration. Membership in such a new kind of existing global regimes. Looking backward across the centuries, Foucault identified the divergence between knowledge, the “anatomic and physiological conditions” of knowledge within the space of the body, versus the historical, social, and economic conditions of knowledge “formed within the relations that are woven between men.” Today this separation is closing, with unprecedented possibilities for the creation of...
with a new kind of authorship enabling the production of deeds that combine, in real-time, the individual, collective, local, global, and embodied relational. This new kind of authorship definitely has emancipatory potential, as demonstrated in the deeds of the Arab Spring and the Occupy movement, as Castells (2012, p. 219) puts it:

"Enthusiastic networked individuals... are transformed into a conscious collective actor... social change results from communicative action that involves connections between networks of neural networks from human brains stimulated by signals from a communication environment through communication networks."

Yet there’s a catch. It is ontologically impossible to conceive of a “conscious collective actor” without consciousness being defined to include the entire range of possible variations of human thought and expression. This is the fatal omission of Carte’s (1842) law and the dictatorial master plans for social physics, and this is the fundamental insight.

found within
the collective.

This was the fatal omission.
doctoral thesis, not an individual-level

The clinical point of Foucault's *Madness and Civilization*: mental illness is a societal construct, not a biological condition. Hence any understanding of consciousness, collective authorship requires a recognition of the "philosophical values accorded to the lives, utterances, and works of artists and thinkers conventionally deemed 'mad'" (Miller, 1993, p. 103).

We cannot praise the true possibilities of consciousness. We can brave the true possibilities of consciousness without the pathological violence of castration, the retroactive violence of degendering, the irreducible cut of black heat, traces and identity, the transgression of legislative silence, to the entire range of ethical poetics and moral fiction.  

 Examination of the 

G12
We can't define authorship in terms of the utopian possibilities of crowdsourced social justice without also including the collective caucuses of pathologically violent mobs of cyberbullies, the insane creativity of black-hat hackers and identity thieves, and the fraudulent "cognitive surplus" devoted to child pornography and stunt film sharing networks. Conscious, collective authors may be brilliant or mad — and usually they are both.
To the degree that collective consciousness is becoming a reality in authorship, however, it is imperative that avenues for change be explored. This brings us to the second element of a contemporary theory of authorship: the understanding of authorship as a socially-constructed investment of power in the author. This understanding is now mediated through the network architecture of neoliberal capitalism and the accumulation of wealth through the exploitation of human labor.
Foucault understood that the power of the author function was to establish relations among texts and discourses among the minds of many readers, (textopia). Camré understood that this power had once been the monopoly of Europe, as Christof Thöny put it, but could be challenged and replaced by the experimental logics of post-scientific knowledge.

Marx understood that this kind of knowledge was relativizing productivity, and was inserted into new machines and industrial processes. And industrial processes could provide opportunities for the appropriation of surplus value. More recently, Elon Musk, Steve Jobs, Mark Zuckerberg, Sergei Brin and Larry Page have understood the consequences of the implications of network technologies. Jeff Bezos accelerated the effects of the capitalist commodification of the global attention span. And what has been done in the network society, content matters,-but within the minds of readers, the architecture of the relations formed among readers matters too. Copyright © 2023
Fortunes are now accumulated through control of
the algorithms gathering real-time data streams from
the digital environment.

This era is characterized by
real-time response time
providing observable
observer through

The death of the author is the birth
of Google's search algorithm,
whose purpose is to answer the constantly changing
questions and
relate vertices related to
people and seek answers.

$40 billion
annual advertising
revenue comes from harvesting

contextual
inference
for testing
In education, vast algorithmic corporate infrastructure are built on 
combinations of code, corporate law, and trust in the marketplace 
for a new network of users, and “manufactured” 
in an evolving networked author function. The whole 
infrastructure is designed to 
the creation of surplus value 
and the new possibilities for 
and markets for educational materials. Other parts of the 
infrastructure -- 
Thomson ISI’s Impact Factors, Google Scholar’s H-index -- are designed to 
measure the “impact” and 
effective institutional legitimacy 
of certain kinds of authors. Other 
parts of the infrastructure are 
designed for various kinds of 
surveillance of the 
disciplinary 
and educational systems. 
Online “learning management systems” (LMS) seamlessly 
integrated with online standardized testing regimes, institutional 
-analytics for ranking, selection, and surveillance of plagiarism 
and competitors. Disciplinary surveillance 
are disciplinary tools, 
nothing new. But no 
generation of humans
has ever lived and worked in this kind of informational world. An aspiring author’s words can, for the first time ever, be subjected to powerful terms of mathematical comparison with the collective social constructs and legal meanings virtually all of a social institution’s collective investments in the meanings, values, and rules associated with the author’s vision. As more and parts of more social institutions are pushed online, the old scalar constraints of geographical limits to governmental authority give way to a more unstable, yet always potential, global network of property institutional properties.

The Kantian canons is also changing: its space is spectral limits are transgressed, so are the temporal horizons of possibility. This is the third dimension of contemporary authorship. There is a greater sense of collective searching and technologies of search.
of engaging a reader's preferences by correlating the
prior reading experiences of individuals with larger collectives
of human knowledge. This correlational aspect
of the author function was once
required the various reading and writing, croquet writing
of mortal human founders of discursivity,
.. hacks
today. Google. Networking algorithms are the
new founders of discursivity, mediating the way most
human readers and actors begin each return to the
origin.

The power and convenience are undeniable: it's
an archaeology of knowledge with the world's
largest backhoe equipped with a

military-precision GPS. Yet the
joyously
infinite combinational possibilities

of seemingly
unlimited search

involve subtle
forms of silent violence. Anything not
digitized and made searchable is ignored,
and
the severity of indifference vastly exceeds
the technological mismatch of
previous generations. Historical depth
is put into useless comparison with the

shallow, shallow, expanding informational
vistas of now. The attraction promises of
speed and efficiency
Foucault asked in 1969. Today, encoun-
ters with such questions always begin with a search engine, and often that's how they end too. Foucault died in 1984, just as "word processing" became the new transdisciplinary of postindustrial society.

Thirty years later, the authorial cyber has evolved beyond the spell-check and the auto-complete: literature searches, algorithms, and citation practices. The algorithmic literature searches have automated the process of judging importance, significance, and influence. Word processing is becoming author processing, and it is getting more difficult to tell which parts of a text were produced by the individual formerly known as the "author."
to have powers of definition and classification at the fine line between madness and brilliance, so that the latter can be valorised and the former is policed.
When the above work is done, it is integrated with the aesthetic and the materiality of the transcendent

Centuries of technological advances in labor-saving technologies have coalesced with planetary information networks, opening the frontiers of automated exploitation and the exploitation of labor (transnational outsourcing circuits) as well as the exploitation of prior generations of workers. And further waves of accumulation based on prior generations of appropriation (Wall Street's high-frequency automated trading algorithms).
In cognitive-cultural capitalism, the author function is transformed in a bizarre hybrid of algorithmic positivism, discursive poststructuralism, and new materialist political economy.
have confused with the innovatively popular and aggressively creative discourses of what Jerry Molder, a former advertising president of a commercial advertising agency, calls the privatization of consciousness.

Molder (2012, p. 23) observes, and the innovation in advertising is a world saturated with advertising and innovation in advertising. The birthplace of Silicon Valley's...
In cognitive-cultural capitalism, Wall Street has become increasingly dependent on Silicon Valley to deliver regular breakthroughs in the speed or efficiency of the commercial colonization of the human attention span. A few years ago, Nielsen estimated that the average U.S. adult sees more than two million television commercials by age sixty-three, and in 2007 Nielsen forged a partnership with Google to “give advertisers a more vivid and accurate snapshot than ever before of how many people are viewing commercials on a second-by-second basis, and who these people are” (Stelter, 2007, p. C1).

Anyone aspiring to become an author -- or a reader, a student, or a teacher -- must undertake the Nietzschean quest “to become what one is” in a world of commercial colonization. “What the Internet has achieved,” Mader (2012, p. 23) concludes, “is a aggregate increase in the time that people actually spend by people “physically attached” to informational machines as their sources of images and ideas. The science-fiction image of the disembodied brain seems more appropriate.” The final frontier of the capitalist colonization of knowledge about knowledge -- the human brain -- is mapped not only by the “downstream” neuroscientists (Garcia and Sareh, 2008), but also by the esteemed cartographers of yesterday’s colonial Others, worlds.
National Geographic’s February 2014 cover story maps “The New Science of the Brain.” It’s almost as if Victor Corvus’s theological science of “interior observation” has been assigned as required reading for Wall Street traders, Silicon Valley digeris, advertising executives, and Wall Street executives demanding ad revenue from publicly traded informational companies. Two decades after Donna Haraway diagnosed the neurological turn in social theory, neuroscience has become popular culture in a planetary privatized consciousness where more than half the world’s population has smartphones.
Nokia promotes the new Lumia 1520 with a bold declaration:

"This phone records feelings," with its advanced high-definition camera and four-directional distortion-free microphones.

"Don't just record. ReLive."
With the

individual

of access to nearly all important
societal knowledge -- first for a privileged
elite and progressively for
then progressively for broader
communities of readers.

GXS
We're drowning in information. The slow primary sensory necessities of human brains fall further behind the expanding volume and accelerating flows of the information society. Neurons can't compete with silicon and code.
Foucault wonders about Nietzsche's laundry list. Do you share my desperate passion to see Nietzsche's emails, as well as Foucault's? Of course you do. What about their text messages? Certainly.

Their tweets, their Facebook status updates, their Instagram selfies and Foursquare check-ins? Yes, of course we succumb to these too.

But only because we know in our soul that it is utterly impossible.
Foucault's analysis of the "giddily reflexive epistemic stance" of the fabrication of Man as an inspiration of the 'Copernican philosophical revolution of Immanuel Kant: the 'empirico-transcendental doublet' is Foucault's terminology for the powers of free will and human freedom. Freedom allowing the subjectivity human.

Kant's achievement in *The Critique of Pure Reason*, where it is the exercise of the mysterious power of free will allows us to bridge the empirical domain of experience and the transcendental realm of reason beyond individual experience.
Can we venture a bold hypothesis?
While the surveillance capabilities were originally devised for undergraduate college-level term papers, iParadigms, LLC, has pursued the larger market of K-12 education as well as other domains of credentialing and creative production.
Comte and the Tower of Science.” In Gerhard Lenzer, ed., The Essential
Publishers, xi–xxi.

Castells, Manuel (2012). Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements

Shirky, Clay (2010). Cognitive Surplus: Creativity and Generosity in

the Neuroimaging Paradigm for Consumer Behavior.” Journal of
Consumer Behavior 7(4-5), 397–414.

18–41.

Stelter, Brian (2007). “In Foray into TV, Google Is to Track Ad Audiences.”
New York Times, October 24, B1, C8.