



**Struggles in the City, Struggles of the City.** Cities concentrate everything in society -- especially disagreement. Over the last decade, a new era of sustained urban protests has emerged, first in response to the accelerated globalization and free-trade initiatives promoted by member countries of the World Trade Organization (WTO), then in response to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March, 2003, then in relation to a wide range of events, causes, and controversies. Above: Vancouver March for Housing, April 2009 (Elvin Wylly).

## **Social Science Debates and Urban Studies**

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### **The Stakes...**

Henry Kissinger was said to have summarized academic politics among his colleagues at Harvard this way: “The battles are so fierce because the stakes are so low.”<sup>1</sup> It’s an easy caricature of arcane scholarly debates, and it might seem to apply to urban studies as well, where

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<sup>1</sup> Although this quote is widely attributed to Kissinger, I’ve also seen quite similar sentiments expressed elsewhere -- so dear Henry deserves neither all the credit nor all the blame. For instance, “It is often said that ‘battles between scientists are so fierce... because there is so little at stake.’” A. De Rujula (2003). “The New Paradigm for Gamma Ray Bursts: A Case of Unethical Behavior?” *Physics and Society*. Cornell University: arXiv. <http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0310134>

“At their best urbanists make the world more understandable,”<sup>2</sup> but often wind up in fierce struggles over method, interpretation, and even the right questions to ask. And “...no synthesis of views is on the horizon; the lack of an agreed-upon conceptual framework and the absence of meaningful consensus among urbanists prevent it.”<sup>3</sup>

*Disagreement is a sign that something really matters. The most important challenge for urban studies is to distinguish between struggles in the city and struggles of the city.*

But Kissinger is wrong. Disagreement is usually a barometer of significance. Debates over urban processes and alternative solutions to urban problems are a sign that the city matters a great deal. Indeed, the city is perhaps the most visible and important crucible where different views, commitments, and projects collide with one another. Many of these collisions are simply struggles *in* the city: debates and disagreements about things that happen nationally or globally, as well as in cities. It

is often most strategically useful to express these debates through meetings or protests that happen to take place in cities, even if the heart of the matter is a general, global issue. Other encounters represent struggles *of* the city: disagreements over who is allowed to do what, where, in a particular city -- or contests over who gets to control a city or a fundamentally urban process.



**Protests Against the U.S. Invasion of Iraq, Cleveland, Ohio, March 2003 (Elvin Wyly).**

<sup>2</sup> E. Barbara Phillips (1996), *City Lights: Urban-Suburban Life in the Global Society, Second Edition*. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 56.

<sup>3</sup> Phillips, *City Lights, Second Edition*, p. 50.



Protests Against the U.S. Invasion of Iraq, Cleveland, Ohio, March 2003 (Elvin Wyly).

## Cities of Science

Most urbanists and other social scientists are taught to follow a rigorous, objective, and systematic set of procedures to obtain valid, generalizable knowledge. While the details vary from one field to another, nearly every social science and physical scientist is familiar with the **scientific method** -- a guide that helps a scientist collect, organize, and analyze information in a way that will provide reliable insights that will help to build a coherent, organized understanding.

The scientific method is premised on a careful distinction between *empirical facts*, *hypotheses*, and *value judgments*. Consider an urban example for the case of homelessness in Vancouver:<sup>4</sup>

1. In the Metro Vancouver region, 2,660 people are homeless, defined as not having a place of their own where they could expect to stay for more than 30 days; 57 percent of the region's homeless are found in the City of Vancouver.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Adapted from E. Barbara Phillips (2010). *City Lights: Urban-Suburban Life in the Global Society, Third Edition*. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, Canada, p. 76.

<sup>5</sup> Greater Vancouver Regional Steering Committee on Homelessness (2009). *Still on Our Streets: Results of the 2008 Metro Vancouver Homelessness Count*. Burnaby, BC: Metro Vancouver.

2. Because there are no homeless shelters in Vancouver's wealthiest neighborhood, Shaughnessy, the residents of this area and the City Council must have fought any attempt to put homeless shelters here.
3. Homeless shelters should be available in all communities throughout the Vancouver region, and should be integrated with other social services to help homeless people get access to permanent, safe places to live.

The first point above is a pair of **empirical** or **factual** statements -- specific observations about particular problems or situations. The second statement is a **hypothesis** -- a testable statement that proposes a causal relationship between two or more variables. In this case, the hypothesis is that certain political actions by Shaughnessy residents and City Council caused the observed spatial pattern of homeless shelters. Hypotheses must be testable, and they must propose specific causal relations between phenomena, or *variables*; un-testable statements are nothing more than assertions. Finally, the third statement is not empirical/factual, and it is not a testable hypothesis; this is instead a **value judgment** -- a argument for how things should be, or for/against a certain course of action.

Distinguishing empirical statements from hypotheses and value judgments can sometimes be tricky. I would argue, for example, that the vast majority of all urban public policy disagreements are caused by a lazy attitude that encourages people to mix factual statements with hypotheses and value judgments. Right now, that sentence is just an assertion. But it does propose a relation between the way different kinds of statements are used, and the outcome of disagreement. I could probably design a study to gather information that would allow me to test this proposition -- to test the hypothesis -- if you gave me a lot of time and money. On the other hand, the adjective "lazy" is a clear signal that I've allowed some value judgments into the mix.

Even if it is difficult, however, it is almost always possible to distinguish *most* value judgments from *most* kinds of hypotheses and empirical/factual statements. Once we do this, we can proceed to use the scientific method, which involves seven steps.

***The Scientific Method: a framework for how to collect and analyze information to generate reliable, scientific knowledge.***

1. *Definition.* Define the scientific question in terms of existing scientific knowledge and previous research.

2. *Classification.* Develop a classification system (or choose an existing, recognized system) to categorize the "raw" information of facts and observations, to organize the infinite complexity of the real world into a manageable form.

3. *Hypothesis Construction.* Construct hypotheses about causal relationships. Hypotheses are testable propositions about cause-and-effect, rooted in particular **theories**. In the most general sense, a theory is an explanation of how a particular

part of the world works. But scientific theories are more than just compelling arguments: established scientific theories are coherent collections of testable propositions that have been tested repeatedly, by many different scientists, and have been consistently supported by the evidence. Scientists typically approach hypothesis-testing through falsification: doing everything possible to *disprove* a theory. Theories that withstand these testing processes over long periods of time are eventually recognized as beyond dispute, beyond question, and at that point scientists refer to the theory as a **law**.

4. *Developing a Methodology*. Determine which methods and techniques will be used to gather the “raw” information described above, to organize it into the classification system, and to analyze it for scientific insights. Key questions include: what will be observed, measured, or collected? How will it be observed? Will all of the events or processes be measured -- or do limited resources and time mean that we will only observe a **sample**? How will the sample be chosen to ensure that it is **representative** of all cases? Or will an **experimental** approach be used -- creating a set of conditions, as in the example of a laboratory, and performing certain operations to see what happens?
5. *Hypothesis Testing*. Data are gathered, organized, and analyzed according to the chosen methods. The testable propositions -- hypotheses -- are evaluated in terms of the “fit” between predicted and observed outcomes, patterns, or processes. Methodological traditions vary according to what is a good fit (supporting the theory) and an unacceptable fit (falsifying the theory), but the essence of the approach is the same.
6. *Theory-Building*. Results of the hypothesis-testing are used to inform theory and scientific knowledge. Results are reported and shared with other scientists. Scientists who refuse to share their results are viewed with suspicion, because the advance of scientific knowledge requires **independent verification**, by many different investigators, who are operating **objectively** -- meaning that they have no vested interests in the outcome of the research and that they work to ensure that they do not accidentally influence the object of study. Results that support a hypothesis are used to strengthen the case for a particular theory, but no individual hypothesis test can be used to provide definitive, conclusive proof. Results that falsify a hypothesis, particularly a hypothesis associated with a new or controversial theory, are often given more credence -- because until a theory has proven itself through repeated hypothesis tests that yield consistent support by independent investigators, it is regarded with great skepticism. In practice, most hypothesis tests are not used primarily to decide whether a big theory is true or false; instead, many research projects are designed to test particular aspects of theories that already have achieved widespread consensus, and perhaps even the status of laws. It is agreed that A has a causal effect on B, but under what conditions does this effect change? Does it change over time? Is it stronger in some places rather than others?

7. *Prediction and Application.* A seventh step is not always performed by “pure” scientists, but it is the area where public interest is greatest: the “so what?” question. Many pure scientists do not see a role for their work here, because there is the risk that imperfect theories -- theories that have not been tested sufficiently or under the right conditions, so that they are not quite yet ready to be accepted with the status of a scientific law -- will be used prematurely for prediction or to make important decisions. Scientists are also wary, because in the public realm, many people easily confuse hypotheses (testable propositions about causal relationships) and theories (coherent collections of hypotheses that have been repeatedly tested and supported to provide a rigorous explanation of a process) with value judgments. Value judgments, remember, are normative statements about what should be done. Most scientists are very cautious about making value judgments. Non-specialists and public officials, however, often care about science only for the purpose of deciding what should be done, who should do it, and how. There is an understandable impatience for the detailed, obscure, hard-

***Positivism: a theory of knowledge that seeks causal explanations by analyzing the relations among observed phenomena.***

to-understand stuff of pure science to be translated into things that can make money or improve some aspect of life as soon as possible. Science in the public realm is thus open to considerable controversy and ongoing debate.

The scientific method is closely associated with a philosophy of knowledge known as **positivism**, which seeks to provide causal

explanation by analyzing the relationships among observed phenomena. Positivism has a long history in science and philosophy, and it is still today generally recognized as the mainstream way of doing science. But for a variety of reasons, many philosophers of science, and many scholars in the social sciences and humanities, now reject positivism and the scientific method. There is a wide range of alternative approaches that can produce various kinds of knowledge. There’s an entire kaleidoscope of “isms” that have become very influential in urban studies, and across all the human sciences: structuralism, humanism/phenomenology, post-structuralism, standpoint epistemology, non-representational theory ... and quite a few others as well. There are so many different choices because the world -- especially the social world -- is such a complex place, and the world cannot tell us out we should understand it. Philosophers and other experts in different fields have thus carved out a wide range of alternative paths to knowledge. We have so many choices today that it’s sometimes hard to keep track of them all; across much of the humanities and social sciences today, people who might disagree on almost everything else will find common ground on one point -- **that they are not positivists**. Philosophy, history, cultural studies, and parts of anthropology and sociology are inspired by a “pluralistic postpositivist counterworld.”<sup>6</sup>

Why all the criticisms of positivism and the scientific method? There are many reasons for this. But one of the simplest explanations has to do with how histories of scientific progress were

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<sup>6</sup> George Steinmetz (2005). “Introduction: Positivism and its Others in the Social Sciences.” In George Steinmetz, ed., *The Politics of Method in the Human Sciences*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1-56, quote from p. 26.

written -- from the 1600s all the way up to the middle of the twentieth century. These histories presented a logical, organized enterprise in which scientists carefully went about each step of the scientific method to test hypotheses objectively, carefully verifying and falsifying hypotheses to

*Positivism is the mainstream, dominant approach in the social sciences, but it is also the most widely criticized.*

build a neat, tidy body of knowledge. A problem of credibility began to surface when it became clear that scientists didn't always *do science* in the way those mainstream histories led us to believe.

### **Should the History of the City be X-Rated?**

Mathematics at the University of Maryland published an article in the prestigious journal *Science*. Asking "Should the History of Science be Rated X?," Stephen G. Brush reviewed the broad new history of science literatures that emerged after the end of World War II.

In March of 1974, a Professor with a joint appointment in the Department of History and the Institute for Fluid Dynamics and Applied

"In recent years, some historians of science have been moving toward another conception of their role, based on the notion that scientists often operate in a subjective way and that experimental verification is of secondary importance compared to philosophical arguments, at least in some of the major conceptual changes that have occurred in science."<sup>7</sup>

*When we learn how to do science, we learn the scientific method. But some of the most important breakthroughs in science came from intuitive, non-scientific inspirations. Some of the fields dominated by the scientific method, in other words, advanced by breaking the rules of the scientific method.*

In other words, scientists don't really *do* science the way we were led to believe: they don't always follow that objective, rigorous, detached Scientific Method. Sometimes they're seduced by intuition and hunches, and sometimes they chase an intriguing possibility even when the experimental data tell them it's wrong. "On the basis of the examples I have studied," Brush concluded,

"I suspect that improper behavior is not peculiar to a handful of great scientists but is characteristic of a much larger group. Indeed, the burden of proof would seem to be on anyone who claims that a majority of scientists habitually use the hypothetico-deductive method in the

strict sense (that is, rejecting a theory if it fails to agree with all experimental

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<sup>7</sup> Stephen G. Brush (1974), "Should the History of Science be Rated X?" *Science*, March (Vol. 183), 1164-1172, quote from p. 1166.

facts). If my interpretation of current historical thinking is correct, the science teacher who wants to use historical materials to illustrate how scientists work is indeed in an awkward position. Perhaps one must finally ask: Are the standards of objective scientific method worth preserving, even as ideals that are rarely attained in practice? Or do we distort our understanding of the nature of science by paying lip service to such standards?"<sup>8</sup>

### Science Studies and Latour's Lament

As it turns out, Brush's playful metaphor of an X-rated history turned out to provide a nice summary of how things changed from the 1970s up to the present day. More and more scholars in the social scientists and humanities began to reject positivism, and began to work in traditions that were often described as post-positivist, non-positivist, or anti-positivist. Many of these alternative traditions drew inspiration from **science studies**, an interdisciplinary movement that regards science as a social practice. Advocates of science studies attack the view of science as a universal, objective, rational body of knowledge about "laws" of nature or the external world -- in other words, science studies is all about the "improper behavior" Brush wrote about. There's a really big literature on science studies, but what matters for us here is that *the interdisciplinary field of urban studies emerged and grew right when all of these struggles between positivism and anti-positivist science studies were playing out*. This means that there are a lot of positivists doing work in urban studies, and also many post-positivist sciences-studies types as well.

Until recently, most of these debates were all very academic -- the positivist versus post-positivist debate was among scientists and philosophers. One of the most prominent figures in science studies was Bruno Latour, a brilliant and gifted philosopher-historian who spent many years talking to physicists, chemists, and other physical scientists, following them around and watching how they worked, and closely studying the evolution of particular (positivist) scientific debates. Much of his work was devoted to what we might call biographies of scientific facts: showing how things that we now take for granted as universal, timeless laws of nature were actually built by the work of people who were not just "doing science" in some strict, neutral sense, but who were also talking, trying to persuade colleagues, fighting for prestige or power, and trying to promote what they saw as the correct way of thinking or doing things.

Outside the academy, however, politics and public life complicated things. As noted above, science in the public realm is always a source of considerable controversy. This controversy became especially pronounced in the United States after the year 2000, where the credibility of science was called into question not for academic philosophical reasons, but for political, cultural, and sometimes even religious reasons. The controversy is by no means limited to the U.S., but it is on vivid display there through the practices of the U.S. Republican Party. As a result, Bruno Latour is now horrified. He's afraid that science studies may have gone too far, or may have attacked positivist science in a way that created unexpected outcomes. Here's how Latour describes his concerns for the case of science and the enormous public debates over global warming:

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<sup>8</sup> Brush, p. 1170.

“What has become of critique, I wonder, when an editorial in the *New York Times*” notes that Republican pollster Frank Luntz advises his Congressional clients stalling action dealing with global warming to “emphasize that the evidence is not complete. ‘Should the public come to believe that the scientific issues are settled,’ he writes, ‘their views about global warming will change accordingly. Therefore, you need to continue to make the lack of scientific certainty a primary issue.’”

“Do you see why I am worried? I myself have spent some time in the past trying to show ‘the lack of scientific certainty’ inherent in the construction of facts. I too made it a ‘primary issue.’ But I did not exactly aim at fooling the public by obscuring the certainty of a closed argument -- or did I? After all, I have been accused of just that sin. Still, I’d like to believe that, on the contrary, I intended to emancipate the public from prematurely naturalized objectified facts. Was I foolishly mistaken? Have things changed so fast?”

“In which case the danger would no longer be coming from an excessive confidence in ideological arguments posturing as matters of fact -- as we have learned to combat so efficiently in the past -- but from an excessive distrust of good matters of fact disguised as bad ideological biases! While we spent years trying to detect the real prejudices hidden behind the appearance of objective statements, do we now have to reveal the real objective and incontrovertible facts hidden behind the illusion of prejudices? And yet entire Ph.D. programs are still running to make sure that good American kids are learning the hard way that facts are made up, that there is no such thing as natural, unmediated, unbiased access to truth, that we are always prisoners of language, that we always speak from a particular standpoint, and so on, while dangerous extremists are using the very same argument of social construction to destroy hard-won evidence that could save our lives.”

“...a certain form of critical spirit has sent us down the wrong path, encouraging us to fight the wrong enemies and, worst of all, to be considered as friends by the wrong sort of allies because of a little mistake in the definition of its main target. The question was never to get away from facts but closer to them, not fighting empiricism but, on the contrary, renewing empiricism.”<sup>9</sup>

## Why Social Scientists Disagree

The plurality of methods and approaches of the last generation, then, give us a messy situation: we’re in for a lot of frustration if we are searching for the One Right Answer, or the One Right Way to Study the City. But we can gain a great deal of understanding *if we take the disagreement itself as a subject of inquiry*. If we try to decide precisely what to think on a particular issue, we’ll surely start fighting amongst ourselves, especially if we talk about things that any of us cares deeply about. Indeed, Bruno Latour draws a distinction between “matters of

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<sup>9</sup> Bruno Latour (2004). “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern?” *Critical Inquiry* 30, 225-248, quotes from p. 226, 227, 231.

fact” and “matters of concern”: things that people care deeply about encourage conversations that highlight disagreement, whereas tempers cool when people regard things as “matters of fact.” Much of politics these days is about different people and groups trying to take matters of fact and turn them into matters of concern, or vice versa.

So let’s avoid trying to tell one another precisely what to think. Instead, let’s consider how to think. And one of the best ways to do that is to simply ask, why do people who care about cities disagree so much when they turn their attention to the complex problems and possibilities of the city?

Barbara Phillips provides a valuable, seven-step guide to help us understand the reasons for all this debate.<sup>10</sup> Four of these reasons tend to be **academic** considerations that matter mostly to those people who are able to spend most of their working days thinking about how best to understand cities or other phenomena. Three of the reasons are more **political**, because they dominate discussions in the public realm outside the walls of academic institutions that are partially protected from political pressures.

1. Differences in theoretical orientation give rise to important disagreements, reflecting varied worldviews, models, and paradigms about how the world works; these broad differences help to determine the kinds of questions that will be asked.
2. Disciplinary perspectives, as we have seen, also shape the way analysts approach a particular urban process.
3. Research methods vary widely within as well as across disciplines, and there are many examples where the method of analysis can have a significant effect on the findings of a particular study. Moreover, the increasing specialization and sophistication of developments *within particular methodological traditions* can lead specialists down separate paths that make it ever more difficult for them to share research findings and find common ground. “Within a single discipline techniques vary, so much so that researchers often find it difficult to understand one another. ... researchers use varying techniques to gather and analyze comparative data. Some study the content of written and other social documents: official statistics, diaries, graffiti, paintings, tombstones, organizational records, TV soap operas, census data, and so on. Others gather information by conducting polls and interviewing random samples of the population (survey research) or setting up controlled experiments. To express the results of these various data-gathering techniques, urbanists use a number of aids: graphs, organizational charts, diagrams, flow charts, statistical tables, verbatim conversational reports, narrative description, and abstract models.”<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Phillips, *City Lights, Third Edition*, pp. 77-95.

<sup>11</sup> Phillips, *City Lights, Second Edition*, p. 62.

4. Levels of analysis help to frame our view of a particular issue or process, and also help to organize the most practical kinds of considerations about what kinds of information to seek out. We can't gather infinite information, and we can't reasonably expect to make sense of every possible event, process, or relationship. And so it is necessary to decide whether to view, say, an urban economy at the micro level (e.g., as the product of choices and preferences of individual

*Four academic reasons for disagreement:*

- 1) *theoretical orientations,*
- 2) *disciplinary perspectives,*
- 3) *research methods, and*
- 4) *levels of analysis*

consumers), meso level (e.g., the decisions of firms competing in city), or macro level (the effect of national or global fluctuations in interest or exchange rates on the competitive prospects of different cities). To understand how individuals fit into neighborhoods, and how neighborhoods relate to broader processes in a city or suburb, and how a particular city relates to other cities in its region or nation, and in turn to global processes -- to understand these types of

connections requires multi-level studies. But these are extremely difficult: they require enormous investments of time and money to gather (or create) suitable data. *And* the results get very complicated very quickly. *And* a growing number of urban specialists are coming to question the neat Matryoshka-doll<sup>12</sup> view of geographical scale.

5. Ideologies and values play a decisive role in shaping urban inquiry: "...many 'isms' and 'ocracies' compete for preeminence. The range is fairly broad, from

*Three political reasons for disagreement:*

- 5) *ideologies and values,*
- 6) *influences on researchers,*
- 7) *attitudes towards solving social problems.*

nationalism, tribalism, feminism, fascism, communitarianism, conservatism, religious fundamentalism, democracy, and technocracy to environmentalism, libertarianism, democratic socialism, neo-Nazism, and anarchism."<sup>13</sup> Phillips carefully scrutinizes the contrasts among three main streams of contemporary ideology: the liberal and neoliberal perspectives; the conservative and neoconservative perspectives; and the radical perspective. The (neo)

liberal and (neo) conservative positions share a common reverence for the

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<sup>12</sup> These are the wooden Russian 'nesting' dolls, usually in sets of five, six, or seven; each small doll fits neatly within the next larger doll.

<sup>13</sup> Phillips, *City Lights*, p. 64.

centrality of the individual, rational consumer, making choices in a dynamic market that is believed to provide the most good to the largest possible number of people; liberals and conservatives part ways on the proper role of government intervention in service to these goals. Radicals, both on the far “right” and the far “left,” advocate fundamental restructuring to alter the very roots of society, urban and otherwise. Yet many of the seemingly obvious left/right and liberal/conservative associations are breaking down or moving into new configurations, making for a much more complex urban political and ideological landscape. The key point to bear in mind is that these labels and positions are always being made and re-made, and thus the role of ideology in urban debates is neither fixed nor static.

6. Influences on researchers. In 1996, Phillips wrote that “Disagreements among urbanists can also stem from another factor: dependence on funding sources. In an era of government- and corporate-sponsored research, it is almost impossible for researchers to be independent intellectuals, answerable to nothing but their own conscience in the long search for knowledge.”<sup>14</sup> Today, I would revise Phillips’ discussion of “subtle influences” to eliminate the word “subtle.” Undertaking the kind of research that will shed new light on complex urban processes takes time and money; and thus the shifting priorities (and sometimes the political struggles within) funding agencies play an increasingly important role in setting the agenda. Moreover, recent years have brought an increased influence of “think tanks.” Some think tanks undertake their own original research -- on issues that matter to them, and usually reaching conclusions that are in line with their core missions. Other think tanks focus on translating specialized or obscure research done by academics into a form that is more easily understood by policymakers. All think tanks try to promote certain kinds of research or policy priorities, and all of them have to compete aggressively to get press coverage for their research findings and/or policy recommendations.

7. Attitudes towards solving social problems vary widely. Some social scientists view their role as pursuing fundamental understanding of basic, fundamental relations; they view it as another job entirely to translate this basic knowledge into recommendations for policymakers. Indeed, many urbanists working in the humanities and social sciences believe this translation process is best left to those in schools of public policy, or non-profit think tanks and other policy shops. But even if we find agreement on the researcher’s role, we still have to sort out disagreements on how to define social problems in the first place: “A case study by sociologist Scott Greer ... illustrates the problematic nature of problem solving. Looking at urban traffic and transportation, Greer asks: Whose problem is it? What kind of people, playing what social roles, define the nature of the metropolitan transportation problem? Who is concerned about it?”<sup>15</sup> These concerns are quite different for wealthy commuters able to choose between driving their luxury car or, every once in a while, taking public transit; for

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<sup>14</sup> Phillips, *City Lights*, p. 72.

<sup>15</sup> Phillips, *City Lights*, p. 72.

bicyclists concerned with safety and accessibility; for people with low income or physical disabilities that limit their choices of transport mode, route, or time of day. “In other words, it is wrong to assume that a social problem is everyone’s problem,”<sup>16</sup> and that it looks the same from each position.

## **Your City**

In 1970, the journal *Public Administration Review* took note of all the disagreements *in* and *of* cities, and published a curious, one-page table by Michael Marien, who was at the time a researcher at the Educational Policy Research Center, affiliated with Syracuse University. Marien’s short piece was titled, “Handy Guide to Public Policy Proposers and Their Proposals.”<sup>17</sup> It was at once hilarious, irreverent, and probably infuriating -- even a bit offensive -- to people in various ‘ideological positions’ and ‘role-related positions’ across the political spectrum. Marien poked fun at the Languishing Liberal, the Middling Moderate, the Counteracting Conservative, the Passionate Pacifist, the Radical Romantic, and the Apocalyptic Apostle; he also lampooned the Emphatic Ecologist, the Tortured Taxpayer, the Stultified Student, and the Frustrated Feminist. Many of the terms and concepts reflect a particular time and place -- the United States after the turbulent 1960s. But even today, the guide still offers a lively way to open a conversation on the divergent views of all sorts of issues related to cities and public policy.

I’ve tried to find a more up-to-date version of this kind of guide, but have never discovered one. So if we have time in class today, I’d like you to discuss this, and come up with at least one new entry, for either an ideological or role-related position.

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<sup>16</sup> Phillips, *City Lights*, p. 72.

<sup>17</sup> Michael Marien (1970). “Handy Guide to Public Policy Proposers and Their Proposals.” *Public Administration Review* 30(2), p. 154. I believe that Michael Marien went on to specialize in “future studies.” See Michael Marien (1992). “The Good-Books Imperative: Keeping up in Futures Studies.” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 522, 140-151.



**The View from Above.** Midtown Manhattan (Elvin Wyly). The view from above can be deceptive. From this vantage point, a city like New York seems like the epicenter of wealth and accumulation. But in the aftermath of a severe recession that began in 2008 and soon became the worst economic climate since the Great Depression of the 1930s, even the billionaire mayor of New York City, Michael Bloomberg, expressed fears of what lie ahead. “The United States’ ongoing struggles with unemployment could lead to riots in the streets, ... Bloomberg warned Friday in his weekly radio address to constituents.” “We have a lot of kids graduating college [who] can’t find jobs,” Bloomberg said; “That’s what happened in Cairo. That’s what happened in Madrid. You don’t want those kinds of riots here.” *National Post* (2011). “New York Mayor Bloomberg Warns Unemployment in U.S. Could Lead to Riots.” *National Post*, September 17, FP17.